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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the 
district court and Idaho Supreme Court denied him access to the courts by denying his 
motions for appointed counsel. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The background of this case, as related by the district court, is as follows: 
The Petitioner Dana Lydell Smith (hereafter "Mr. Smith") was 
convicted of Grand Theft in Minidoka County case CR-2004-2628. The 
court sentenced Mr. Smith to a unified term of confinement of fourteen 
years with seven years determinate. Mr. Smith appealed. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Smith's judgment of conviction in an 
unpublished opinion filed May 20, 2009. The remittitur was issued on 
June 24, 2009. 
On October 31, 2008, Mr. Smith filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief in Minidoka County case CV-2008-892, which was summarily 
dismissed on May 7, 2010. Mr. Smith appealed. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Smith's original post-conviction 
Petition in an unpublished opinion filed November 14, 2011. 
(R., pp.162-63.) 
On February 18, 2011, Smith filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
in which he also requested appointed counsel. (R., pp.1-46.) The district court denied 
his request for appointed counsel, noting that Smith's successive petition was untimely 
and therefore frivolous. (R., pp.118-23.) Smith filed a motion to clarify (R., pp.125-49), 
which the district court denied (R., pp.151-54). 
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On November 21, 2012, the district court announced its intent to dismiss Smith's 
petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that is was untimely. (R., pp.156-60.) On 
January 3, 2012, the district court entered an order and a judgment dismissing Smith's 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.162-65.) Smith filed a motion to alter or 
amend judgment and a motion for appointed counsel. (R., pp.167-92.) The district 
court denied both motions. (R., pp.197-200.) Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from 
both the judgment of dismissal and the district court's order denying his motion to alter 
or amend judgment. (R., pp.202-08.) 
With his notice of appeal, Smith requested the appointment of appellate counsel 
(R., p.209), which the district court granted (R., p.210). However, after a review of the 
record, appointed counsel concluded that she could not "represent Mr. Smith and 
comply with IAR 11.2," and so moved to withdraw and allow Smith to proceed pro se. 
("Motion To Withdraw As Counsel Of Record And To Allow Appellant To Proceed Pro 
Se" and the affidavit in support thereof, filed October 5, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion To 
Withdraw").) The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion. ("Order Granting Motion 
To Withdraw As Counsel And Allow Appellant To Proceed Pro Se," filed October 23, 
2012 (hereinafter "Order").) 
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ISSUES 
Smith states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court and the Idaho Supreme [sic] when it failed to 
appoint counsel after appellant advised them that there was no law library 
at the prison. 
2. Did the district court err when it dismissed the appellant's petition 
for post-conviction as being untimely? 
3. Did the district court err in not ordering a psychiatric evaluation sua 
sponte before its dismissal of the petition for post-conviction and the 
motion for the appointment of counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Smith failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court and the district court 
violated his constitutional rights by denying his motions for appointed counsel? 
2. Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his untimely 
successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
3. Has Smith failed to show that the district court was required to, sua sponte, order 





Smith Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Rights 
A. Introduction 
Below, Smith requested appointed counsel for his successive petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., p.11.) The district court, finding that Smith's claims were time-
barred and therefore frivolous, denied the request. (R., pp.118-23.) Ultimately, the 
district court dismissed Smith's untimely successive post-conviction petition (R., pp.162-
65) and Smith appealed (R., pp.202-08). Smith requested appointed appellate counsel 
(R., p.209), which the district court granted (R., p.210). However, after reviewing the 
record and determining that Smith's claims were frivolous, appointed counsel concluded 
that she could not "represent Mr. Smith and comply with IAR 11.2," and moved to 
withdraw. (Motion To Withdraw). The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to 
withdraw. (Order.) 
On appeal, Smith "asserts that the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court 
violated his right to access to the courts, and the due process clause, by its denial of the 
appointment of counsel." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Smith has failed to establish a 
violation of any of his constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
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v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Violate Smith's Constitutional Rights By 
Allowing His Appellate Counsel To Withdraw 
Smith asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him access to the courts by 
denying the appointment of appellate counsel. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Smith had 
appointed counsel for this appeal. However, appointed counsel determined that all of 
Smith's claims were frivolous and moved to withdraw. (Motion To Withdraw). The 
Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion. (Order.) 
1. If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Smith Has Failed 
To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme 
Court's Order Denying His Motion For Appointed Counsel 
In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant 
his constitutional rights by denying a motion made prior to assignment of the case. In 
doing so, the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the 
Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to 
the state or federal constitutions or other law." kl at_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an 
undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals 
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond 
the purview of this Court." kl In the event that this case is assigned to the Court of 
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Appeals, Smith's arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the 
Idaho Supreme Court's order allowing appellate counsel to withdraw. 
2. On The Merits. Smith Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement 
To Counsel On This Appeal 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Smith's claim, his assertion still fails. 
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings, 
whether in the trial court or on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 
(1987) (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial proceedings, the defendant's 
"first appeal as of right, and no further"). The Idaho Supreme Court, therefore, did not 
violate Smith's constitutional rights by allowing his appellate counsel to withdraw. 
D. The District Court Did Not Violate Smith's Constitutional Rights By Denying His 
Request For Appointed Counsel For His Post-Conviction Petition 
Smith asserts that the district court violated his constitutional rights by denying 
the appointment of counsel on his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) As 
noted above, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial 
proceedings, the defendant's "first appeal as of right, and no further"). Idaho Code § 
19-4904, however, allows courts to appoint post-conviction counsel. The decision of 
whether or not to appoint counsel in post-conviction cases lies within the discretion of 
the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004). A district court may deny a request for appointment of post-conviction counsel 
when the claims raised in the petition for post-conviction relief are frivolous. Judd v. 
State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009). Post-conviction claims that are 
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time-barred are frivolous. Hurst v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 686, 214 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
Concluding that Smith's successive petition for post-conviction relief was 
untimely and therefore frivolous, the district court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, 
denied Smith's request for appointed counsel. (R., pp.118-23.) The state adopts as its 
argument on appeal the district court's reasoning for its denial, as set forth at pages 4-6 
of its "Order Denying The Petitioner's Request For Appointment Of Counsel," attached 
hereto as Appendix A, and at pages 2-4 of its "Order Denying The Petitioner's Motion 
To Clarify," attached hereto as Appendix 8. 
E. Smith Has Failed To Show That He Was Denied Access To The Courts 
Smith asserts that he was denied access to the courts both below and on appeal 
because, he claims, the prison's law library is inadequate. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) 
"To demonstrate the denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must show 
that shortcomings in the prison legal program prevented his effort to pursue a claim. 
The Constitution requires only that inmates be given a reasonably adequate opportunity 
to present to the courts their nonfrivolous legal claims relating to their convictions, 
sentences, and conditions of confinement." State v. Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 626, 213 
P.3d 406, 411 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996)). 
Smith claims that the prison's law library is inadequate, but has failed to show that any 
alleged shortcoming prevented him from pursuing his legal claims, either below or on 
appeal. Indeed, he was able to research and cite cases and statutes, and adequately 
presented and discussed legal concepts such as equitable tolling and the relation back 
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doctrine. (See, .ML., Appellant's brief, pp.5-21; R., pp.126-49.) Smith, therefore, has 
failed to demonstrate that he was denied access to the courts. 
A. 
II. 
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Untimely 
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Introduction 
Smith was originally convicted of Grand Theft and appealed. (R., p.162.) His 
conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal and remittitur entered on June 24, 
2009. (Id.) On October 31, 2008, Smith filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, 
which was summarily dismissed on May 7, 2010. (Id.) Smith appealed, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed on November 14, 2011. (R., pp.162-63.) On February 18, 
2011, Smith filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1-46.) The 
district court summarily dismissed the successive petition on the basis that it was 
untimely. (R., pp.162-65.) 
On appeal, Smith asserts that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that it was timely filed from the 
denial of his initial post-conviction, that the time limits should be equitably tolled, or that 
his successive petition should relate back to his timely filed initial petition due to alleged 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-22.) Application of 
the correct legal standards to the facts alleged by Smith shows no error in the district 
court's dismissal of his untimely successive post-conviction petition. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Smith's Untimely Successive Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. To be timely, a post-conviction proceeding must 
be commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of 
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). Under Idaho 
Code § 19-4906, a district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction 
relief when it "is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the 
record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief," by indicating its 
intention to dismiss and giving the parties an opportunity to respond within 20 days. I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b); see also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
Adhering to the requirements set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), the district 
court summarily dismissed Smith's successive petition on the ground that it was 
untimely. (R., pp.162-65.) In his underlying criminal case, Smith was convicted of 
Grand Theft and appealed. (R., p.162.) In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction, with remittitur entering on June 24, 2009. (Id.) 
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Smith filed his successive post-conviction petition on February 18, 2011 (R., p.1), more 
than a year after his judgment became final on appeal. Smith's successive petition for 
post-conviction relief was therefore untimely under Idaho Code § 19-4902. 
Smith argues that the time limits for filing his petition should be subject to 
equitable tolling. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) In the case of successive petitions, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude 
courts from considering 'claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the 
time limit, yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 
250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 
174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). Idaho appellate courts, therefore, have allowed for 
equitable tolling in circumstances where the petitioner is incarcerated in an out-of-state 
facility without access to representation or Idaho legal materials, where his mental 
illness or medications render him incompetent and prevent him from pursuing a timely 
challenge to his conviction, or where the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered 
evidence. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009). 
However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitations period should be tolled, 
any petition filed outside the one-year limitation period of Idaho Code § 19-4902 is time-
barred and subject to summary dismissal. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 
30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001); Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793 
(Ct. App. 2011). 
Smith failed to show that the limitations period on his post-conviction proceedings 
should have been equitably tolled. As noted by the district court, Smith has not argued 
that he was incarcerated out-of-state without legal representation or access to Idaho 
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legal materials, or that his claims are based on newly discovered evidence. (See R., 
pp.1-46, 158.) While Smith did note that he has a mental illness and has been on 
psychotropic medications (R., pp.140-46, 149), he failed to show that his illness or 
medications rendered him incompetent or prevented him from timely filing his 
successive petition (R., p.158). Smith's petition, therefore, is not due equitable tolling, 
and the district court correctly dismissed it for being untimely. 
Smith argues that his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief 
should relate back to his timely-filed petition, because, he alleges, his attorney was 
ineffective. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-22.) Where a petitioner's initial post-conviction 
petition is summarily dismissed due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, 
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 
189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008). However, to show ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Smith was required to show that his attorney's performance was deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984). To establish a deficiency, Smith was required to show that his attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 
114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, Smith was 
required to show that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, his petition would not 
have been summarily dismissed. & at 761,760 P.2d at 1177. Smith failed to show 
that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. 
On appeal, Smith alleges that his post-conviction counsel was deficient in that he 
failed to secure expert testimony and other evidence for impeachment purposes. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-22.) However, "[c]ounsel's choice of witnesses, manner of 
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cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or 
strategic, decisions." Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 
1994). The Court will not second guess the tactical or strategic decisions of counsel 
unless they are based on an objective shortcoming. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 
233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Smith failed to show that his counsel's 
perf~rmance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Smith also failed to 
show that his counsel's allegedly deficient performance in not obtaining the specific 
testimony caused the dismissal of his initial petition. Smith therefore failed to show that 
his counsel was ineffective. 
Because Smith failed to show that his initial petition was summarily dismissed 
due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, he has failed to show that the 
relation-back doctrine applies to his successive petition. Smith's successive petition is 
therefore untimely and the district court correctly dismissed it. 1 
1 Even had Smith established ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his 
successive petition would still be untimely. Even where successive post-conviction 
claims are not subject to the strict time limits of Idaho Code § 19-4902, they still must be 
brought within a reasonable time under Idaho Code § 19-4908. See Rhoades, 148 
Idaho at 250-51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70. Smith alleges that his initial post-conviction 
petition was dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.13-22.) Smith's petition was dismissed in May, 2010. (R., p.162.) Smith did not 
bring his successive petition until February, 2011. (R., pp.1-46.) Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, however, should be known immediately. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 
252, 220 P.3d at 1071. Nine months is therefore not a reasonable time to bring a 
successive post-conviction petition on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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111. 
Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Required To, Sua Sponte, 
Order A Psychological Evaluation Before Dismissing His Untimely Successive Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief 
"Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is on the party 
alleging it." Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004) 
(quotations omitted); Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390, 64 
P.3d 304, 316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of showing error on record and error 
never presumed); State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) 
(appellant has burden of showing error in record). On appeal, Smith raises as an issue 
whether the district court erred by not ordering a psychological evaluation sua sponte 
before denying his motion for appointed counsel and dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, p.4.) However, nowhere on appeal has Smith made 
any argument that he was entitled to an evaluation or that the district court erred by not 
ordering the evaluation. (See generally Appellant's brief.) The most Smith offers is a 
sentence in his "Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings" that "the failure to 
order a psychiatric evaluation before dismissal of the post-conviction substantiates, the 
abuse of discretion of the courts or whomever should have ordered this to check the 
mental status of the Appellant and his ability to proceed without assistance." 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) Having failed to provide any argument that the district court was 
required to, sua sponte, order a psychological evaluation before dismissing Smith's 
successive post-conviction petition and denying his request for counsel, Smith has 
waived this issue and it should not be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
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Even had Smith presented some argument that the district court erred by not 
ordering a psychological evaluation before dismissing his petition for post-conviction 
relief and denying his request for counsel, that argument would still fail. Idaho statutory 
law requires a trial court to order a psychological evaluation in criminal cases when 
there is a genuine reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in his own 
defense or understand the proceedings. I. C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. However, there is 
no corresponding requirement in civil cases. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates 
a new and independent civil proceeding. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 
P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983). Because there is no entitlement to a psychological evaluation in a civil 
proceeding, the district court did not err by failing to, sua sponte, order the evaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Smith's untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2013. 
c~ 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DANA L YDELL SMITH 
IDOC #87854 
IMSI A-Block 
PO Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
~ 
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0a Feblmy 11, 2011, Mr. Smith ffled a successive Petition for Post-Ccmvic:tion Relief in 
th6 pzesent case. The State med its answer on August 9, 201 1. In his Petition. Mr. Smith makes 
tba followina argumm1I repn6na the pmceedinp In the undalyiDa criminal cue prior to the 
appeal: 
(]) be WIii denied Ida ripl to coumel al I pe-trlat lmmp; 
(2) be received Jnaffidive aeist,nm of couwl .a trial because his attmmy. 
(a) failed to in:veatipte the facts of the cue and potential dcfemes, 
(b) failed to adequatel7 prepare for trial: 
(cl) fidled tom.•'* modom prim to aad durlna trial; 
(f) failed to request I specific jury imCruction; 
(3) the court admitted prejudicial hcaray that the defense could not effectively cross-
(5) the prosecution filled to collect or pnserve eviclmce favorable to Mr. Smith; 
(6) the plOIICldion failed to dtsclole the identity of an informant wbo actively 
participated in ad wu a wi1nlll to the crime; 
(7) the court made emn that denied Mr. Smida a fair 1rial; 
(I) be WII dmiecl diaccmry of rm8dendaJ IICOlds that wen, material to the defense; 
(9) be WU •lectlvely prosecuted based OD bis race; 
(10) the cow1 denied him his rlpt to I speedy trial; 
(11) the plOIICldion lmowinpy used. or tiUed to com,ct, pmjured tesdmony; 
ORDER DENYING THE PETITIONER'S REQUf.ST FOR APPOINTMENT OP COUNSEL 119 
CV-2011-246 
.. 
'. . '1 
(12) he wu convicted II a result of a police interrogation conduetecl without counsel 
piesenl after he ~ counsel in the context of a separate investigation; 
(13) bis confession was oblainccl durina a police iutanoptioa in wbfch hi was denied the 
ript to have counsel pmcnl; and 
(14) the Idaho Department of Correction denied him his right to an adequate law library 
and lepl assistanco. 
Mr. Smith makes the followina arguments regardlna the underlyina criminal case durina 
i 
the appeal phase of the pmceedJnp: 
(2) be RCOivcd inefToctlve assistance of counso1 on appeal because bu attomr:y failed to 
raise the foJlowina is.,ues OD appeal: 
(a) Joshua Johnston's petjm, and 1be prosecution•s inducement for him to testify; 
(b) statememl made to tho jury which violated the court's rulina on a motion in 
Umlne; 
(c) proper jurildfction of the cour11 in Utah and in Idaho to IUle on evidence and 
for law enfon:rmcmt to ini1fate aa invesdption; 
(d) Joshua Johnston's crim1m1 hisrmy, mmdll health ml1uadon, and prior drua 
test while OD probation; 
(e) failure to secure additional medical records by counsel and expert witnesses to 
substantiate Mr. Smith's position that there was Insufficient m,na rea to support 
the criminal charges; 
(f) inconsisten.cia In statemeDtl by law enfon::ement, the prosecutor, and 
proaecutioD witnesses wbich should have belll suppressed or excluded; . 




{s) whether the couns in Utah and Idaho were advised of evidendary issues; 
(h) whether the actions of Dan Price and Dennis James corrupted the testimony of 
Joshua E. Johnson, due to their intmacdoD with him la Utab; and 
(I) whether Mr. Smith's dpt to a speedy trial had bem vlolmd. 
After settina forth all of his claims, Mr. Smith lnduded in his Petition a request to 
proceed in fonna pauperis and a request for appointment of counsel. He dicl not make these 
requests by separately filed motions, nor did he pro'Yide a supporting affidavit. Upon discoverina 
Mr. Smith's reqlllllt fbr appoi111ment for counsel, tbo court toot 1he matter under adYisement. 
DISCUSSION 
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that a post-conviction petitioner may have court• 
appointed coumel. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed eounse1 in a post-
conviction case lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792, 102 P .Jd 11 OS. 1111 (2004). Tho court perceives the issue as a matter of discretion and 
exercises that discretion within the bounds provided by the following legal authority. 
A trial court should appoint counsel in a post-conviction case "if facts are allepcl givlna 
rise to the poulbUlty of a valid claim." Judd v. State, 148 Idabo 22, 24, 211 P .3d 1, 3 (Ct App. 
2009). A coult may only deny a request for appointed counsel if all the claims In the petition are 
£rivolous. Id. A post-conviction claim that is time-barred is tiivolous. HU8I "· State, 147 Idaho 
682, 686, 214 P .Jd 668, 672 (Ct App. 2009). 
A post-conviction petidoa Mmay be tiled at any time within one (1) year &om the 
expiration of the time for appeal or tom the determinsdon of an appeal or from the 
determination of a pn,ceedin1 followina an appeal, wbicheYer is latar." LC. § 19-4902(a). An 
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appeal is considered to be "determined" upon the appellate court's issuance of the rmnitdtur. s,, 
Leer v. Stale, 148 Idaho 112,114,218 P.Jd 1173, 1175 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Tbe one-year statute of llmitadona for post-conviction actions may be equitably tolled 
under the followfna circumstances: (1) "where the applicant was incarcerated in an out-of-smm 
facility without lepl r~tation or access to Idaho legal materfals"; (2) "where mental 
disease and/or psychotropic medication nmderccl the applicant incompetent and prevented him 
from pursuing earlier challenges to the conviction"; or (3) in limited circumstances, where a 
petitioner dflcovorl the ticts glvina rise to the claidl at a later dare. Judd 11. Sia#, 148 Idimo 22, 
25-26, 211 P.3d 1, 4-S (Ct. App. 2009). 
Tbe Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Smith's convictiall in aa unpublisbecl opinioa 
filed May 20, 2009. The remittitur was issued on June 17, 2009. Pursuant to LC.§ 1M902(a). 
Mr. Smith was required to file his post-conviction petition on or before June 17, 2010} 
However. bis filed this Petition on February 18, 2011, approximately eight months aftar the 
deadlJne. Tberefbre the claims in Mr. Smith's post-conviction Petition reJatina to the proceed!np 
in CR-2004-2628 appear to be time-barred. 
It does not appear that Mr. Smith baa offered ·any explanation for the untimely fllhia of 
the Petitioa that would equitably toll the statute of Umitatiom. He does not assert that he was 
incan:erated in an om-of-state facility without representation or aceess to Idaho legal materials; 
be does not assert that he was incompetent due to a mental disease or psychotropic medication 
I 1'bl OGll1...,..... tJia afnol dll JdabD Coat of Appeals [1111111 dll remltdtur, Mr, Smida Ml coadallld to flle 
pro .. madam Ill CA-2004-2621. lncladlna I Madan ror I Nn Trfll, I Modm fbr I Fonlltl ~ • Mtdon to 
·Abs. Amend• Judpw,t' -· Madan for ean-.. Redlll:dm ofSea1twe, lCR 35. Howtt•, Mr. Smkb 
ba nat rlflldlllJ ... ....,,. ftaD .... polMpplltl praceedlnp. n..tore, dll 11111111 ofUmi1ldaDI OD tbl 
fuua bl ha raiNd bepD to nll GIIICI 1111 ftllldllu Wll fllUld OIi JuDI 17, 2009, 
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whieh pievented him tiom punuina earlier cbelJenps to the conviction; and he does not assat 
thal be discovered the filCtl givina rise to the claims at a later date. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Mr. Smith's clabnl in bis poat-conviction Pedtion appear to be tm.bamld. At tbia point, 
Mr. Smith baa failed to show tbaa the statute of llmitadom should be equitably tolled. Since tbl 
claims appear to be ftivoloua because they are lllltlmely, Mr. Smith's iequeat f'CJr app,iah1• .of 
counsel is denied. "1-
lt is so ORDERED this l" day of Augusa, 2011. 
MICHAEL R. CRABTRBB 
Discric:C Judp 
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PA~L•c= 
IN mE DISTRICT COURT OP THE FtFnl JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP 
111E STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUN1Y OP MINJDOICA 
DANA L YDELL SMl'IH. 
STATE Of IDAHO, 
nefeadant 
Cue No.CV-2011·246 
ORDD DENYING TD t£"Hl10Dll'S MOTION TO CLARDY 
PJlOCEDIJRAL IL\CKGll.OlJND 
n. Pedifomr Dinirydell Smidi (Jiinafir "Mr: Siidill,-._-coliilcmf o!Oriiid ,w- · 
la MJnJdnka County case CR-2004-2621. Tile court sentmced Mr. Smida to a unified tenn of 
C()Dflzwiwna of lourtceo yeas. witb savcn yara deCllminale. TIii Idaho Co1III of Appeals 
aftlnmd Mr. SmJth'1jnd.....- of cometice DI ID uapubllshecl opiaion med May 20, 2009. Mr. 
Smida &led I Pdloa for Poll-Ccmvicdon Rellcf fa Mlmdab CounlJ c:ase CV•200l-l92, wbicll 





. .., .. 
011 Februmy 11. 2011, Mr. Smith fDed a 1UCCC111M Petition far Post-ccmvicdon Jlelief in 
cbl praml ca11. Mr. Smldl iDdudal in bll Pmdcm a rcquat f'ar appoinlment of c:ounaa. The 
co11t eatlnd Ill order OD Aupll 30, 201 l dmylna Mr. Smida11 request far appoin..,_,. of 
coume1 bec11w bis Pcddaa wa filed ~ of tbo one-year sllllum of limftadolll far post• 
coavictim .... 
OD Seplwoher 29, 2011, Mr. Smida flied a Motion to Clarify and a suppcudna 
Mlmonwdom It IIIIPCIII dlll Mr. Smid1 filed die iDllaDt Madon ID Older to addnlll Iha court's 
cam:luam eta be WIii nat adidcd ID the appoildmml of C01IILW in dUI CIIO boaen• Im 
L lq ....... Tolllaa 
The ~year staSute of limitadou for post-conviction rdiaf' may bo equitably tolled 
mder dll foDowlq camn,111...-: (l) ~ 1111 ...,._.. w ~ID• 01ll-okm 
flldUtJ witboa& Jepl iij8t& Mklino m' ICCaa ID Jdabo Jepl ~ (2) ..... Dlllal 
.... llld/m paydlotropil meckldoa rtmdmd tlll applfclnt iDODmpeltlll IDd pmmted Jdm 
8am pnulaa .-liar dwlJenpl ID die caavlcdaD"; ar (3) la limflal ~- I a. wlme a 
peddc-• dllmrm 1111 &Im alYina rise ID die clafm It a Jar cl& JwJtl., &at,, 141 ldabo 22, 
25-2', 211 P .3d I, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Mr. Smbla .,,.. to bl arplna that equitable 1Dllina sbould apply IDd bit ...... 
Petidaa should bf doemed dmely bfclUII hi ba been OD psycbocroplo mecffeatioa slnce 1919. 
Mot. ~ 24. Mr. Smida ba not arped or shown 1h11 his peychotlOplc medlcldo.a ba 
rendlllld him incomplteat a, pmenmi him &om punuina ID carffar, timely cbalJenp to bil 
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CODYicdoa. JDdeed, Mr. Smi1h ffled I timely pro • post-convicdoa pedtioa in Mhddoka County 
C111 CV-2008-892, IIDll m ba trequendJ flied motfau ml odler documeDII in dm cua, bis 
IID&ferfJlna crlmfaaJ CW. and fn tm present case. 'J'bcn is DO t.fs for the court to rmc1ude that 
Mr. SmJdl'1 plJCbD1mplo mdcadoaa prevealld him hm chaPenafna bil CODVictlon in I timely 
w. Tbac£:n, Mr. Smith baa failed to show tlllt equitable tollfna sllauld apply iD dda c:1111. 
A paidons 'UY fDI I succcmive post-cmmcdon pdttioa outside ofdle om-year-.., 
of lhnftwdrm .. roJmi -* to the dmely - of the fnidll post-cmmcdan peddoD if "tbl 
cx,mt ftndl I p,und ftJr reUaf lllllfllll whlcll fbr sufBc:lenl laal WII DOI 111111111d • WIii 
hlldequmlJ ndled la 1111 ~ ,upplnnea1ta1. at amended applicalkm. • LC. f IM90I; 
.W.W. 1. SW., 14J Idabo 116, 189, l'n P.lcl 400. 403 (CL App. 2008). lftbe petitlans'1 
'1nldll aw)lcadoa w 111mnmity cllPDimd a to the aUcpl inetfec:tlvmas of the initial post· 
COIMOtioa ODIIDlel, 1111 of thl relation-back ducbiml may be appropdare." Sclrwaru, 145 ldabo 
• 119, l'nPJdd403. 
la die Modem 1D ~. Mr. Smfdl appclll to be aqpdna dllt the reladae-ba doalliDI 
UDUld apply la tlda C110 '*'1• hfa COIIDSIII In the lnitlal post-caaYfcdcm Jll1I eecflna, mnill . 
Bina (bereaftlr-Mr. BlawD"). W11 inefftcdve. ID hfa Memmudum. Mr. Smith pnmdlll 1111 
followlJII .......... reprdlaa hit initial post-coamctiaa cm: (1) Mr. BJOWD sbould haw brm 
awue ofdll ..... ralll of pleedina m. civil cw. punum to LR.C.P. I; (2) Mr. Bmwn ftiled 
to alt wida him; (3) Mr. 8nm buna up tbl tllepbam CII Mr. Smitb OD lfflnl 000,si,'!lli (4) 
Mr. Smida WII na1 pamiUld to cmcr I coumuom la April of an unknown year, eYeD wbm m 
told dll 1-ilifl 1h11 be wfsbed to fire hll counsel mt proceed wfdl bis cw; and (5) Mr. 11ruwa•1 
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